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The Costs and Benefits of  
Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Adam Sechooler* 
Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is a controversial yet fundamental aspect of the 
American regulatory state.1 Despite its importance, many commentators have 
argued that the costs and benefits of CBA have not been adequately weighed.2 
Concerns about CBA are all the more salient following the Financial Crisis of 
2007–2008 and the Great Recession. In the aftermath of what is generally 
considered the most severe financial crisis and economic contraction since the 
Great Depression,3 scholars and other experts continue to rethink the role of 
regulation and the tools available to regulators. Although the debate continues about 
whether we have too much or too little regulation, the Financial Crisis precipitated 
a historically significant expansion of regulation. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, signed into law in 2010, is often considered 
the most far-reaching financial regulatory reform since the New Deal.4 The Act 
 
* J.D., University of California, Irvine School of Law, 2013. This issue of the UC Irvine Law Review is 
published in conjunction with a conference that was held at the University of California, Irvine School 
of Law on March 13, 2013, and was sponsored by the UC Irvine Law and Economics Society. In 
addition to the contributors to this issue, the Law and Economics Society would like to thank the 
following participants and supporters: Robert Ahdieh, David Arkush, Ann Carlson, Alejandro 
Camacho, Erwin Chemerinsky, David Driesen, Daniel Farber, James Hackney, Sean Hecht, Mitchel 
Kider, Mike Konczal, Sarah Lawsky, Christopher Leslie, Michael Livermore, David Min, Amit Narang, 
Frank Partnoy, Katherine Porter, Marcus Stanley, and Shauhin Talesh. The author would also like to 
especially thank David Min and Phil Syers, as well as Sasha Nichols and the other student organizers, 
without whom the symposium would not have been possible. 
1. See infra notes 26–34 (discussion of the role of CBA). 
2. John Coates, for example, notes that “[n]o published study shows empirically that CBA 
produces benefits that outweigh its costs—whether CBA in practice passes its own test.” John C. 
Coates IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case Studies and Implications, 124 YALE L.J. 
(forthcoming 2015) (working paper at 11 n.30) (Eur. Corporate Governance Inst. Working Paper No. 
234, 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2375396. 
3. Great Depression scholar and Former Federal Reserve chairman Ben Bernanke stated that 
he believes “September and October of 2008 was the worst financial crisis in global history, including 
the Great Depression.” Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY 
REPORT 354 (2011); see also THE GREAT RECESSION (David B. Grusky et al. eds., 2011) (discussing the 
effects of the Great Recession on individuals). 
4. See, e.g., Edward Balleisen, The Global Financial Crisis and Responsive Regulation: Some Avenues for 
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affects virtually every part of the U.S. financial services industry and created several 
new regulatory bodies, including the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, a new 
independent agency.5  
In addition to questions about the extent of regulation, the Financial Crisis 
also raised crucial concerns about how we regulate. Some of these concerns are 
rooted in a renewed skepticism about the assumptions that underlie complex 
quantitative models. Amar Bhidé, for example, critiques “top-down measures”—
including those of Dodd-Frank—because risk “can be quantified only to a degree.”6 
Just as the quantitative models behind complex financial products depended on 
assumptions that turned out to be faulty, Bhidé cautions against theories of 
regulation that assume “not just rationality in the ordinary sense of the word, but 
also universal omniscience.”7 Instead, Bhidé argues for a decentralized approach to 
regulation and an approach to finance that would take “into account unquantifiable 
uncertainties and the uniqueness of individual circumstances.”8   
The underlying epistemological concerns about the limits of quantification 
that some commentators raised in response to the Financial Crisis are also relevant 
to CBA. As Amy Sinden’s article in this issue makes clear, CBA “is not a monolith.”9 
Some forms of CBA are more formal than others.10 Nonetheless, CBA is typically 
thought of as a fundamentally quantitative methodology. As Arden Rowell writes,  
Modern regulatory cost-benefit analysis is a systemized method of 
comparing the expected advantages and disadvantages of proposed 
policies. The method relies on a process of monetization that converts 
nonmonetary costs and benefits into a common metric—money—by 
using market- and preference-based studies of people’s willingness to pay 
money to acquire benefits or avoid costs.11   
Thus, while the exact definition of CBA may be debated, it is typically thought of 
as a process that aggregates the costs and benefits of a regulation and, where 
necessary, converts those costs and benefits into a common quantitative metric. 
 
Historical Inquiry, 44 U.B.C. L. REV. 557, 558 (2011) (describing Dodd-Frank as, “depending on one’s 
point of view, the most far-reaching overhaul of national regulatory policy toward the financial system 
since the New Deal, or a watered down set of technical fixes that do too little to tame the ever more 
powerful, and dangerous, beasts of finance”). 
5. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection (Dodd-Frank) Act, 12 U.S.C. 
§ 5491 (2012). 
6. AMAR BHIDÉ, A CALL FOR JUDGMENT: SENSIBLE FINANCE FOR A DYNAMIC ECONOMY 
276 (2010). 
7. Id. at 271. 
8. Id. at 282–83, 289. 
9. Amy Sinden, Cost-Benefit Analysis, Ben Franklin, and the Supreme Court, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 
1175, 1176 (2014). 
10. Id. In addition to variation in the form of CBA, another important set of distinctions involve 
to what extent and in which ways CBA is or is not legally mandated. See Coates IV, supra note 2 
(manuscript at 9–11). 
11. Arden Rowell, Time in Cost-Benefit Analysis, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1215, 1218 (2014) (citing 
Arden Rowell, The Cost of Time: Haphazard Discounting and the Undervaluation of Regulatory Benefits, 85 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1505, 1517–20 (2010)). 
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CBA may therefore be susceptible to the critiques of quantification discussed above. 
For example, Frank Ackerman and Lisa Heinzerling critique CBA because it 
requires quantifying “priceless” values, like human health and safety or the ethical 
principles underlying environmental protection.12 Instead, Ackerman and 
Heinzerling argue for a “holistic approach, where costs as a whole (usually 
monetary) and benefits as a whole (often largely nonmonetary) are considered 
together—but are not forced to be expressed in the same units.”13 
 Of course, CBA has many defenders and advocates.14 Some scholars have 
emphasized the importance of CBA in enhancing efficiency15 or even rationality.16 
Others have argued that CBA can strengthen democratic accountability because it 
makes agency decision making more transparent to both the public and elected 
officials and insulates “agencies from powerful political pressures.”17  
Recent scholarship has also attempted to reframe the debate by moving it from 
an absolutist “for or against” to a more contextual “when and how.” Scholars have 
argued, for example, that CBA’s practitioners should abandon a narrow focus on 
economic efficiency and instead focus more broadly on maximizing well-being. In 
short, cost-benefit analysis should be redubbed well-being analysis (WBA) and use 
the metric of happiness, broadly defined, rather than money.18 Because it seeks to 
directly measure the effects of regulations on people’s well-being, WBA may avoid 
the “distortions created by using money as a proxy for people’s quality of life.”19 In 
another effort to reframe the debate, Richard Revesz and Michael Livermore argue 
that what is often thought of as CBA’s antiregulatory bias is “historical rather than 
conceptual.”20 According to Revesz and Livermore, reform can remove CBA’s 
“systematic antiregulatory biases.”21 With the addition of “distributional analyses of 
 
12. FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF 
EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2004). 
13. Id. at 212. 
14. For a review of the debate surrounding CBA, see Rowell, supra note 11, at 1216. 
15. See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE L.J. 
165, 187–94 (describing the “conventional defenses of CBA,” including Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks 
efficiency). 
16. See, e.g., RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY: 
HOW COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH 12 
(2008) (“For certain kinds of governmental programs, the use of cost-benefit analysis is a requirement 
of basic rationality.”). 
17. Paul Rose & Christopher J. Walker, Dodd-Frank Regulators, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Agency 
Capture, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 9, 13–14 (2013); see also REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 16. But 
see ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 12, at 215 (“The frequent claims that cost-benefit analysis 
would provide objectivity and transparency in decision making have the story backward: a holistic 
evaluation is desirable precisely because it is more transparent and accessible to participation, because 
it avoids the opaque technicalities that characterize cost-benefit studies in practice.”). 
18. See, e.g., MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-
BENEFIT ANALYSIS (2006); John Bronsteen et al., Well-Being Analysis vs. Cost-Benefit Analysis, 62 DUKE 
L.J. 1603 (2013). 
19. Bronsteen et al., supra note 18, at 1689. 
20. REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 16, at 10. 
21. Id. at 191. 
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the cumulative effects of regulation,” a reformed CBA could lead to a fairer and 
more efficient administrative state.22 In a still more recent effort to recast CBA, 
Robert Ahdieh writes that CBA in financial regulation should take on a broader, 
less quantitative but equally rigorous form.23 Ahdieh also emphasizes the 
importance of “embracing a discourse of cost-benefit analysis focused on the 
diversity of functions it may serve and the varied forms it may take.”24 Ahdieh 
points to four factors—the source of law, the nature of the responsible agency, the 
nature of the problem, and the variables to be analyzed—that should be weighed in 
determining whether or how CBA should be used in a given situation.25 
 Regardless of the current state of the academic debate surrounding CBA or the 
renewed skepticism about quantification following the Financial Crisis, it is unlikely 
that the importance of CBA will diminish anytime soon. CBA is required by 
numerous statutes and has been embraced by each successive presidential 
administration, both Democratic and Republican, since President Reagan mandated 
CBA by executive order in 1981.26 Recent events suggest, if anything, that CBA is 
becoming more influential and perhaps more quantitative. The proposed 
Independent Regulatory Analysis Act,27 which is strongly opposed by many 
environmental and public interest groups28 and strongly favored by many business 
groups,29 would allow the President to require independent agencies, including the 
newly formed Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,30 to conduct CBA even when 
it is not otherwise mandated by statute.31 Moreover, Arden Rowell writes in this 
issue that a new executive order under President Obama exhibits “a heightened 
emphasis on the importance of quantification over prior cost-benefit orders,” 
according to a number of commentators.32 Recent court decisions also affirm the 
continued importance of CBA. Perhaps most notably, in Business Roundtable,33 the 
District of Columbia Circuit vacated a Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
rule because, according to the court, the SEC failed to adequately weigh the costs 
 
22. Id. 
23. Robert B. Ahdieh, Reanalyzing Cost-Benefit Analysis: Toward a Framework of Function(s) and 
Form(s), 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1983, 2070–71 (2013). 
24. Id. at 1993; see also Sinden, supra note 9, at 1177 (discussing different conceptions of CBA). 
25. Ahdieh, supra note 23, at 2025–35. 
26. REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 16, at 11; Bronsteen et al., supra note 18, at 1606. 
27. Independent Agency Regulatory Analysis Act of 2013, S. 1173, 113th Cong. (2013). 
28. See, e.g., Impact of the Independent Regulatory Analysis Act, S. 3468: Further Delaying 
Needed Safeguards for Our Economy, DĒMOS: IDEAS & ACTION, http://www.demos.org 
/sites/default/files/publications/Impact%20of%20the%20Independent%20Regulatory%20Analysis
%20Act%20S_3468.pdf (last visited Sept. 26, 2014). 
29. See, e.g., BRT Letter Supporting S.3468, The Independent Agency Regulatory Analysis Act, BUS. 
ROUNDTABLE (Sept. 18, 2012), http://businessroundtable.org/resources/brt-letter-supporting-
s.3468-the-independent-agency-regulatory-analys1. 
30. For a discussion of the Independent Agency Regulatory Analysis Act in the context of 
consumer protection, see Jeff Sovern, Can Cost-Benefit Analysis Help Consumer Protection Laws? Or at Least 
Benefit Analysis?, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1241, 1242–43 & n.4 (2014). 
31. S. 1173. 
32. Rowell, supra note 11, at 1220. 
33. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
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and benefits of the rule as a formerly obscure section of the National Securities 
Market Improvement Act required.34  
 An understanding of the costs and benefits of CBA is all the more important 
given the expansion of rulemaking under Dodd-Frank. It is still unclear just how 
pervasive CBA will be or what form of CBA will be adopted in the context of 
financial regulation. Some commentators have argued that financial regulation is 
particularly well suited to CBA, while others have argued precisely the opposite. For 
example, John Coates offers a series of case studies and concludes that while some 
forms of CBA may be useful, quantitative CBA is “not currently feasible with any 
degree of precision and reliability for representative types of financial regulation.”35 
Instead, Coates emphasizes the centrality and inescapability of expert judgment.36 
In the context of financial regulation, according to Coates, CBA is therefore more 
likely to “camouflage” underlying motivations than to inform the public or 
discipline regulators.37 In contrast, Eric Posner and Glen Weyl argue that, if 
anything, CBA is better suited to financial regulation than to other forms of 
regulation, because the costs and benefits of financial regulation are “almost all 
monetary,” and are thus easier to estimate and compare.38 
 Determining the right role, if any, for CBA in financial regulation—or any 
regulatory field—depends on understanding the costs and benefits of CBA in the 
contexts in which it is practiced. A better understanding of the many facets of CBA 
involves addressing at least three questions: (1) What is CBA? (2) What are the 
challenges of quantifying costs and benefits and how can those challenges be 
addressed? (3) What are the “on-the-ground” regulatory problems that CBA must 
be able to account for if it is to be an effective regulatory tool in a specific context? 
The three articles in this issue make important contributions toward addressing 
these questions.  
 Amy Sinden’s article highlights the “wide and divergent array of decision-
making practices” encompassed by CBA.39 Through a case study of Entergy v. 
Riverkeeper, a 2009 U.S. Supreme Court case involving the Environmental Protection 
Agency’s (EPA) interpretation of Clean Water Act regulations related to power-
plant cooling water intakes, Sinden reveals the importance of “distinguishing among 
 
34. For a detailed analysis of the implications of Business Roundtable, see Ahdieh, supra note 23. 
35. Coates IV, supra note 2 (manuscript at 85). 
36. For another example, see BHIDÉ, supra note 6. While Bhidé emphasizes the importance of 
judgment to a productive financial system, he advocates judgment that is decentralized and rooted in 
relationships. 
37. Coates IV, supra note 2 (manuscript at 11–15, 85). 
38. Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Benefit-Cost Paradigms in Financial Regulation 13 (Univ. of Chi. 
Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 660, 2014), available at http://papers 
.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2346466; Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Cost-Benefit Analysis 
of Financial Regulations: A Response to Criticisms, 124 YALE L.J. F. (forthcoming 2015) (working paper at 
13) (Univ. of Chi. Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 683, 2014), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2436538. 
39. Sinden, supra note 9, at 1176. 
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different forms of CBA.”40 In particular, Sinden distinguishes between formal and 
informal forms of CBA. She cautions against what she calls “false formality,” which 
occurs when agencies “fail to clearly define where on the formality-informality 
spectrum a particular CBA falls” and “inappropriately combine[ ] elements of 
formal and informal CBA.”41 False formality leads to irrational outcomes because it 
results in the misinterpretation of doctrine, muddies debate, and produces 
intellectual incoherence.42 
 Arden Rowell’s article takes on the task of explaining how CBA can value 
future costs and benefits. She argues that two aspects of time pose distinct 
challenges for cost-benefit analysis.43 First, temporal asymmetry means that time 
only flows in one direction. This means that “[r]esources, information, harm, and 
risk can only be presented from the present to the future.”44 Temporal asymmetry 
therefore “undermines the possibility of meaningfully reciprocal relationships 
between the present and the future.”45 Rowell argues that regulators should respond 
to this temporal challenge by being especially attentive to the distributional issues 
related to temporal asymmetry.46 Second, the “flow” of time creates challenges for 
managing the “temporal scope” of cost-benefit analyses.47 For example, what is the 
proper endpoint when calculating the costs of nuclear waste?48 To respond to this 
challenge, Rowell argues that regulators should clearly delineate the temporal scope 
of their analyses.49 Rowell also suggests that regulators “consider calculating 
temporal ‘break-even’ points to identify the time point when the benefits of a rule 
will have justified the costs.”50 
Finally, Jeff Sovern discusses CBA from the perspective of a leading scholar 
of consumer law. Sovern notes that while CBA has often troubled consumer 
advocates, it may help consumers if it is responsive to the challenges regulators face 
when crafting effective consumer protection regulations.51 For example, Sovern 
explains that many consumer protection rules fail because consumers fail to use 
them.52 Sovern’s article therefore provides an important insight into the kinds of 
complex behavioral considerations for which CBA must be able to account. Sovern 
also notes the difficulty CBA may face when it attempts to measure the costs and 
benefits of some rules ex ante.53 He argues that pilot projects and variation in policy 
 
40. Id. at 1178. 
41. Id. at 1177. 
42. See id. 
43. Rowell, supra note 11, at 1222. 
44. Id. at 1224. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. at 1228. 
47. Id. at 1230–31. 
48. Id. at 1232–33. 
49. Id. at 1239. 
50. Id. 
51. Sovern, supra note 30, at 1243. 
52. Id. at 1244. 
53. Id. at 1260. 
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across states may be particularly useful for evaluating policies in such cases.54 Some 
benefits of consumer protection, such as financial privacy, may also be particularly 
difficult to quantify.55 Sovern argues that consumer protection agencies “should 
attempt to demonstrate that protections will have benefits, but should not 
necessarily be forced to quantify those benefits, because often the benefits cannot 
be quantified.”56   
 Given the evolving and potentially expanding role of CBA, scholarship on 
CBA is more important than ever. As important as CBA is, it also raises issues that 
go well beyond CBA, including the nature and purpose of regulation, the role of 
courts in reviewing administrative decisions, and epistemological questions about 
the limits of quantification. Indeed, rethinking CBA may even provide a key starting 
point for rethinking regulation more broadly. The articles in this issue make an 




54. Id. at 1159–60; see also Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Minimalism and Experimentalism 
in the Administrative State, 100 GEO. L.J. 53 (2011) (advocating experimentalism rather than CBA). 
55. Sovern, supra note 30, at 1262. 
56. Id. at 1261–62. 
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